Legitimacy Deficits in the European Cartel Investigation Procedure
A Comparative Legal Study on the Legitimacy of the Scope of Application of Criminal Procedural Rights in the EU Cartel Investigation Procedure, with Special Consideration of the Nemo Tenetur Principle
Legitimacy Deficits in the European Cartel Investigation Procedure. A Comparative Legal Study on the Legitimacy of the Scope of Application of Criminal Procedural Rights in the EU Cartel Investigation Procedure, with Special Consideration of the Nemo Tenetur Principle«: EU cartel proceedings lack legitimacy. A basis for this allegation is cartel fines which now reach into the billions. To examine this hypothesis, a legitimacy review of the sanction and defense regime of the EU cartel procedure is conducted. The legal nature of cartel fines and the status of the undertakings as addressees of the sanctions are analysed as a basis for justifying the reduction of criminal procedural rights in EU cartel proceedings. The legitimacy standard is developed from the constitutional traditions common to the EU member states – on the basis of a structural-functional legal comparison of investigative and defense rights in sanctioning procedures involving undertakings, particularly regarding the nemo tenetur principle. The study concludes that the reduction of criminal procedural rights is not legitimate under current law and that the EU cartel procedure has a legitimacy deficit.